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SHORT FALL ARGUMENTS IN COURT: A PROBABILISTIC
ANALYSIS
Maria Cuellar*
I will be talking today about how statistical arguments are used in
court, specifically in cases of Abusive Head Trauma in which the
defendant has claimed that an accidental short fall, and not shak-
ing or child abuse, has caused the child’s injuries. So actually the
Johan case1 that Peter Aspelin was talking about leads perfectly into
this. In particular, I will be talking about one specific paper by
David Chadwick et al. from 2008.2 In this paper, he and his col-
leagues calculate the risk that a child, a young child, will die from a
short fall.3 They find that the risk is less than one in a million.4 In
fact, 0.48 in a million.5 I will be providing some criticism of how this
quantity gets used in the court; then I will provide an alternative
method for figuring out whether a short fall could have caused this
specific child’s injuries, and I will close by talking about the chal-
lenges that we have today with respect to data.
What I will call the Chadwick paper is a study that was written by
David Chadwick, from the University of Utah, with seven co-authors
in 2008.6 It has the unambiguous title of “Annual Risk of Death
Resulting from Short Falls Among Young Children: Less than One
in a Million.”7 And as I said, 0.48 in a million is the quantity they
calculate.8 So to calculate this value, they used a database called the
EPIC database, which stands for the Epidemiology and Prevention
for Injury Control database. I will talk in detail about how they
found the value shortly.
* PhD student at Carnegie Mellon University; joint program in Statistics and the
Heinz School of Public Policy and Management. BA, Reed College; MS, Carnegie Mellon
University.
1. Joseph Shapiro, Dismissed Case Raises Questions on Shaken Baby Syndrome. NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/21/167719033/dismissed-case-raises-
questions-on-shaken-baby-diagnosis.
2. See generally David L. Chadwick et al., Annual Risk of Death from Short Falls among Young
Children: Less than 1 in 1 Million, 121 PEDIATRICS 1213 (2008) (describing results from a sys-
tematic review that found only six possible fall-related fatalities of young children in a
population of 2.5 million young children over a five year period).
3. Id. at 1214.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See generally id.
7. Id. at 1214.
8. Id.
763
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This paper is very careful in defining what a short fall is, specifi-
cally. They define it as a fall from a height of less than five feet in
which the horizontal velocity is no faster than that which a child
could have achieved alone.9 They define their population very spe-
cifically. They choose the population of infants, ages zero to five.10
This is the only paper of which I am aware that provides a numeric
estimate for how likely it is for a short fall to cause death. For this
reason, it is used widely both in the literature and in court.
A few other papers have also looked at the issue of short falls. I
will talk about two of them here. The first one is John Plunkett’s
paper from 2001.11 In this paper, he reviewed eighteen cases of
deaths in infants that had been caused by short falls,12 and he re-
viewed each case in detail. What is important about this paper is
that he showed that deaths can indeed be caused by short falls.13
But he does not provide a specific numeric estimate that will tell us
how common it is for a child to die from a short fall. The paper by
David Moran, Keith Finley, Patrick Barnes, and Waney Squire from
2012 titled “Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abuse Health Trauma, and Ac-
tual Innocence: Getting it Right”14 has a short section that criticizes
the Chadwick paper.15 The Moran et al. paper also does not provide
a numeric estimate for how common it is for a child to die from a
short fall.16
To arrive at their estimate of 0.48 in a million, Chadwick et al.
used the EPIC database from California, which has death records
from various medical examiners, in addition to other sources.17
They used data from 1999 to 2003,18 and they counted the number
of infants who had died from a short fall in California in this time
period.19 Just six were not disproven as short fall deaths.20 Then
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls, 11
AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 1 (2001) (concluding that an infant or child may suffer a
fatal head injury from a fall of less than three meters (ten feet)).
12. Id. at 2.
13. See id. at 10 (concluding the falls from less than three meters may be fatal).
14. See generally Keith A. Findley, Patrick D. Barnes, David A. Moran & Waney Squier,
Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209 (2012) (providing a history of SBS, its evidence, and calling for more
collaboration between medical and legal communities to “get it right”).
15. See id. at 247–48.
16. See generally id.
17. About the Fatal (Death) Data, Nonfatal Patient Discharge (Hospitalization) Data, and Nonfa-
tal Emergency Department (ED) Data, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/
HealthInfo/injviosaf/Pages/EpiCenterdata.aspx#fatal (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
18. Chadwick et al., supra note 2, at 1214.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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they divided six by the number of all infants in California during
this time period.21 So if you wanted to convert this to a probability
statement, you might say this is the probability of an individual hav-
ing a death and short fall, given that this individual is an infant in
California, in the period of 1999 to 2003. They found that this value
was 0.48 in a million.22
What I claim is that in court, implicitly, what is being argued is
that this value of 0.48 in a million is equivalent to the probability
that the child had a short fall given the evidence in that criminal
case, the evidence being this is an infant with head trauma and
death. Assuming that the 0.48 in a million is indeed this probability
implies that the probability that the child was shaken, given the evi-
dence, is the complement of that. That is, one minus 0.48 in a
million. When one computes this number, one gets a probability of
99.999% that the child was shaken, given the evidence.
The problem is this argument is incorrect. The argument is, in
other words, that short falls almost never cause deaths, and, there-
fore, this defendant must have shaken the baby or must have
abused the baby. As opposed to other authors who have criticized
Chadwick’s quantity, I actually believe that Chadwick’s quantity was
calculated correctly. I, myself, went into the database, the EPIC
database and counted the number of short falls in this time period
and found that, indeed, it is 0.48 in a million. But, my argument is
that it is the implicit argument used in court that is incorrect.
Now, I will talk about a few of the criticisms I have about using
the Chadwick quantity in court in the way in which it has been used.
The first criticism is that, as we have seen in the previous talks, rare
events are not impossible. Chadwick and co-authors found the
deaths due to short falls are 0.48 in a million, but today in the
United States there are twenty-four million infants. So, we would
expect to see at least twelve infants die from a short fall this year. A
child in a specific legal trial could be one of these twelve. This argu-
ment was mentioned earlier this morning by Peter Aspelin, and it
was also mentioned in the paper by Findley, Moran et al. from
201223 that I mentioned earlier. It has also been used by various
expert witnesses in the courtroom. For illustration purposes, I cal-
culated a few other values to show that they are also very small. The
prevalence of having Abusive Head Trauma (including cases of
Shaken Baby Syndrome), according to the specific database that I
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generally Findley et al., supra note 14 (providing a history of SBS, its evidence, and
calling for more collaboration between medical and legal communities to “get it right”).
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will mention later, is eighty-five in a million. All of these are very
small values. But again, they are not zero.
The second criticism I have for using the Chadwick quantity in
the way in which it has been used is that one must restrict the popu-
lation in light of the evidence that has been provided in the case.
The way that Chadwick et al.24 calculated their quantity was for the
entire population of infants. If you recall, I said that they divided six
by the number of all infants in California in that specific time pe-
riod. But we know some more information about this infant, not
just that he is a child in California. This is not a healthy child. This
child has head trauma and has died. Or, in a different case, we
might have a child who has not died, but also has head trauma.
What we must do is restrict the population in light of this additional
information. So, in a probability statement, we would write this as
the probability that a child was shaken, given that this is an infant
with head trauma and death. This “given” part is called “condition-
ing.” By conditioning, we are restricting the population to a smaller
subset, as the figure below shows.
The large oval represents all the infants in the United States. A
small group will be those who have head trauma and an even
smaller subset of that will be the ones who have head trauma and
death.
This argument has been used by various experts in court. Some
have called it the problem of having the wrong denominator. What
24. See generally Chadwick et al., supra note 2.
SPRING 2017] Short Fall Arguments in Court 767
they mean is that one needs to focus on the population that is rele-
vant in light of the evidence.
The third criticism is that this quantity calculated by Chadwick et
al.25 is calculated in isolation. What I mean is that they calculate the
probability that one event happens—that is, that a child will die
from a short fall. But they do not calculate any of the probabilities
for any other possible events that might have caused the outcomes,
in order to provide a comparison of the two occurrences. We need
to find out how likely these other possible causes are before we
make any conclusions about what is more likely. So for example, if
we have an event that has a probability of happening of one in a
million, and we compare it to another one that has a probability of
one in four hundred million, all of a sudden, one in a million
seems very common. So, what we would really like to estimate are
fractions like
The one on the left is the quantity that answers the question,
“Were these injuries caused by a short fall?” Here we are dividing
the probability of that a child had a short fall, given the evidence,
over the competing hypothesis, which is that the child did not have
a short fall, given the evidence. Eventually what we would like to get
is a quantity for whether these injuries were caused by shaking or by
child abuse with intentional actions. That ratio is the fraction on
the right: the probability of shaking, given the evidence, divided by
the probability of not shaking, given the evidence. Again, the evi-
dence being that the child has had trauma and death, or maybe just
had trauma, depending on the child’s specific circumstances. So,
we can expand this ratio that I mentioned, the probability of shak-
ing, given the evidence, over not shaking, given the evidence, by
looking at the denominator specifically. We can do this by ex-
panding the probability that the child was not shaken into the
probability that the child had an accidental short fall, given the evi-
dence, plus the probability that the child had other causes, given
the evidence. Other causes might be, for instance, some of the con-
ditions that have been described by Patrick Barnes and others this
morning, conditions that might mimic the symptoms of Abusive
Head Trauma or Shaken Baby Syndrome. These include things like
rickets or Vitamin D deficiency. A question that might follow is,
“How do we really obtain a value for this ratio that the probability
25. See generally id.
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of the child was shaken, given the evidence, divided by the
probability the child was not shaken, given the evidence?”
For the purposes of this talk, and just for this talk, I will define
the evidence as the triad of symptoms mentioned previously, de-
fined here as retinal hemorrhage, cerebral edema, and subdural
hemorrhage.26 I am aware that there has been some debate about
what are the symptoms that really indicate Shaken Baby Syndrome
and Abusive Head Trauma. Here, I just included the classical triad,
but we could include any number of symptoms that a researcher
would like to include in the analysis.
What we can do with this quantity is that we can expand it by
using Bayes’ rule. So the fraction on the left-hand side becomes a
product of two fractions on the right-hand side.
On the right-hand side, the first fraction is the probability (with
the evidence given) that the child was shaken over the probability
(with the evidence given) that the child was not shaken. Then, that
is multiplied by the second fraction—the odds that the child was
shaken. So, the first factor on the right hand side is the quantity
that a statistician might be able to address. This is the quantity that
one could, in theory, obtain from the data. And that is all a statisti-
cian can calculate. The second factor, the odds, is what can be
calculated for a specific case. This quantity is up to the jury and the
judge to decide, not the statistician. The evidence that could be
relevant in the odds factor is, for example, the amount of time that
this person was spending with the child, or whether the child has
injuries from prior abuse.




26. Goran Hogberg et al., Circularity Bias in Abusive Head Trauma Studies Could Be Dimin-
ished with a New Ranking Scale, 6 EGYPTIAN J. FORENSIC SCI. 6, 7 (2016).
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The table above shows the quantities we would need in order to
calculate the first fraction on the right-hand side. In order to calcu-
late this properly, we would need to fill in this table with the
number of children who were shaken and had traits corresponding
to the evidence (e.g. triad and death), the ones who were shaken
and did not have traits corresponding to the evidence, the number
of children who were not shaken and have traits corresponding to
the evidence, and the ones who were not shaken and did not have
traits corresponding to the evidence. To do this properly, we would
need to use a database that has a sample that is representative of
the population at large. We could not just use a few examples of
similar cases in a hospital, for instance, since this could lead to se-
lection bias. Since they are rare cases, the sample should be large as
well, because when you have very few events, there might a great
deal of variability, which could lead to misleading results. When you
have a larger sample size you might be able to arrive at more stable
results.
Now I do not know if filling in this whole table seems suspicious
to any of you, or at least like a difficult task. For example, if the
evidence is that the child had the triad, one of the values necessary
is the number of children who were shaken and did not have the
triad. You would need to have a database that correctly reports the
values necessary for that calculation, and it is possible that although
a child could have been shaken and did not acquire the triad, this
might not be recorded in the database. So, there are many chal-
lenges with filling in this table in order to calculate the value
properly. If you were dealing with a case in which the child had
died in addition to having the triad, for instance, you would need to
not just include the cases that had the triad and no triad, but the
cases that had the triad and death and no triad and death in order
to calculate these values properly.
I looked at some major databases that one might use to fill in this
table. The first one is the one that Chadwick et al.27 used, the Epide-
miology and Prevention for Injury Control database from
California.28 There are a few problems with this database from a
statistical point of view. It has a very small sample size, which means
it might not be very useful for observing rare events. It is not repre-
sentative of the United States population because it is limited to
California. I looked at another database called the Kids’ Inpatient
27. See generally Chadwick et al., supra note 2.
28. EPICENTER: CAL. INJURY DATA ONLINE, http://epicenter.cdph.ca.gov (last visited Jan.
13, 2017).
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Database.29 To clarify, this is not the same one that Patrick Barnes
mentioned this morning, the KidsData.org.30 They are two different
databases but have similar names. The Kids’ Inpatient Database is a
very large database that has a sample size of about three million
children, and it has been updated every three years since 1997. It
has information from hospital records all around the United States.
The database is built from a random sample of hospital records in
about 4500 hospitals, and it is very rich. It contains information
about the primary and secondary diagnoses for each record, which
include up to fifteen diagnoses. These might include things like the
triad. It contains information about external causes of injury, which
is very detailed and varied data. For instance, it has information
about railway accidents, poisoning, and short falls. It contains infor-
mation about whether the child died, and many other variables.
When I was starting this project of analyzing the Chadwick31
quantity and how it is used it court, I thought I could provide a new
estimate and fill in this table with the Kids’ Inpatient Database be-
cause it seemingly has all the variables I would need, and it has a
large enough sample size. I started doing that and then I realized
that even this dataset, which is so rich and large, is highly biased. As
I mentioned before, the cases where the child has fallen but does
not have the triad would not be included there. To visualize why
there is bias in the data, we draw a possible sequence of events be-
low about the data gathering process.
Maybe the event happened at home—that is, maybe someone
dropped the child at home. It makes sense that then the child
would be taken to a hospital, but perhaps some children will not be
because the parents might believe there has been no real harm. At
that point, the children who were not taken to the hospital are
missed in the database. That is, there is some underreporting at
that stage.
29. Kids’ Inpatient Database, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.: AGENCY FOR HEALTH-
CARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/research/data/hcup/kid.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2017).
30. KIDSDATA.ORG, www.kidsdata.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
31. See generally Chadwick et al., supra note 2.
SPRING 2017] Short Fall Arguments in Court 771
Then, after the child arrives at the hospital, the physician might
make a diagnosis, and this is subject to cognitive or human bias, like
the one discussed this morning. In some hospitals, some cases
might be categorized as a short fall, and some cases might be cate-
gorized as shaken. That is a misclassification problem with the
diagnosis. Then, in the final stage of the data gathering process,
someone needs to enter this information about the diagnosis into a
database using codes used in the Kids’ Inpatient Database (i.e. the
ICD9 or ICD10 codes, which are the International Classification of
Diseases). If this gave rise to data entry errors, we might say this
does not generate a bias because the errors could go in either direc-
tion—that is, the cases might be both underreported and over-
reported. But we could also imagine that a person in charge of data
entry might have a certain opinion about Shaken Baby Syndrome
or about this specific case, and so he or she might enter the data in
a specific way that is systematically biased. This chain of events
shows that the data from one of the best sources that I could find is
flawed and has inherent biases.
To summarize, the Chadwick32 quantity should not be used in
court because of the criticisms I mentioned. The first is that rare
events are not impossible. The second is that we need to restrict the
population in light of the relevant evidence, and the Chadwick cal-
culation does not do that. The third is that one must compare
competing hypotheses, again, in light of this evidence. Otherwise,
this quantity, the Chadwick quantity in isolation, is of no use to the
court. I argued that a better alternative to the Chadwick quantity to
determine whether a child had a short fall would be to calculate
this ratio,
But what the court is really concerned with is whether the defen-
dant shook the child, so we need to calculate this ratio,
To calculate it, the information must be combined in a very spe-
cific way, with additional information from the case, to arrive at the
proper final ratio.
32. See generally id.
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But, as I found in my analysis, the data that are available today
are not of high enough quality to allow for a proper calculation of
this quantity. So, any calculation that I make with this table today, if
I were to show it to you, would be wrong. It would be false. I would
like to say that a correct statistical argument about the United States
population cannot be made to answer the question, “Could this
child’s injuries have been caused by a short fall?” I would like to
close by saying that if you do use a statistical argument in court, you
need to make sure it is based on high-quality data—which is not
available today—and an appropriate probabilistic analysis. You
need to include comparisons of competing hypotheses and not just
one rare value in isolation, because that comparison is what is rele-
vant in court. Thank you very much.
